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1. Introduction 
This paper is about multi-level and multi-actor governance of supervision, and the Dutch 
Consumer Authority is used as an exemplary case. Nowadays, supervising in 
public/private networks and on the basis of a responsive strategy is widely considered 
the optimal ‘formula’ to effectively fulfil supervisory tasks when these concern enterprises 
which in turn operate in national and international networks.2  
The Consumer Authority fits this ticket perfectly as it is equipped to fit in with existing 
civil law and self-regulatory mechanisms to uphold consumer protection, while at the 
same time it has administrative law instruments that have been newly added to the tool-
box of consumer protection law. Furthermore, the Consumer Authority is to act as a 
partner in the European network of national consumer authorities, whereas, on the other 
hand, nationally it needs to coordinate its efforts with other public supervisory agencies 
and with private consumers’ organisations. On a yearly basis the Consumer Authority 
presents an Agenda setting forth its strategic supervisory priority-criteria and main areas 
of interest.   
 
Although the Dutch Consumer Authority seems a perfect example of modern supervisory 
governance, the question remains, whether this image of supervisory ‘networking’ and 
‘flexible response’ to infringements of (EC) consumer law, isn’t in effect hampering 
transparency and thus accountability, and if ‘vertical’ public law remedies aren’t pushing 
out ‘horizontal’ private or self regulatory solutions.  
 
This question, which suits the attempt to arrive at more general findings, will be 
discussed on the basis of a description of the Consumer Authority’s underpinnings, the 
EC Regulation on consumer protection cooperation (in short Rcpc),3 and  the Dutch Act 
on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection (AECP),4 and the first impressions of its 
activities in real life. Next we will look into both the matter of accountability and of public 
versus private law. 
 
 
2. Underpinnings; the legal framework 
2.1. The Rcpc (EC Regulation on consumer protection cooperation) 
 
Cooperation 
The main objective of the Rcpc is cooperation between national authorities and between 
national authorities and the European Commission.5 The key to cooperation is the 
                                                
1 Michiel Heldeweg is professor of Public Governance Law at the University of Twente. Some descriptive parts of 
this paper have been taken from Heldeweg’s article, Supervisory governance – the case of the Dutch Consumer 
Authority, as published in Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 1 (June 2006). 
2 See J.G. van Erp, Lessen voor toezicht in de 21 eeuw; actuele inzichten van Braithwaite en Sparrow, Justitiële 
verkenningen 2008/6, p. 9-21, esp. p. 1013-14. 
3 Regulation (EC) no. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the 
Regulation on consumer protection cooperation), OJ 2004 L 364/1, 9.12.2004 (hereinafter referred to as Rcpc). 
4 AECP, Statute of 20 November 2006, concerning rules on entities responsible for enforcement of consumer 
protection laws (houdende regels omtrent instanties die verantwoordelijk zijn voor handhaving van de 
wetgeving inzake consumentenbescherming (Wet handhaving consumentenbescherming)), OJ (Stb.) 2006, 
591. 
5 See Article 1 Rcpc, supra note 3. For a broader policy perspective on the renewal of European consumer 
policy, see the documentation under 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/consumers/overview/cons_policy/index_en.htm. For the Green Paper on European 
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concept of mutual assistance6 between national consumer authorities, either concerning a 
request (through a single liaisons office) for an exchange of information (Art. 6 Rcpc) or 
to take enforcement measures (Art. 8 Rcpc). The requested authority ‘shall supply’ 
(without delay) any relevant information, respectively ‘shall take all necessary 
enforcement measures’ (for the cessation or prohibition of an infringement), but each 
consumer authority has discretion as to the effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality 
of the requested response.7 The requested consumer authority can ask other public 
offices to assist in responding properly to the applicant’s request, but it can also seek 
assistance from ‘bodies with legitimate interest’.8 
Thus the Regulation creates a network of enforcement authorities to deal quickly and 
adequately with cross-border infringements (by the ‘most rogue traders’)9 of EC laws, 
regulations and directives which protect consumers’ interests.10 This implies that national 
authorities must sometimes execute foreign law. Sharing knowledge about the domestic 
law of 28 countries and understanding the pertinent differences is therefore of great 
importance. This is where the network can play an important role.11  
 
Entities 
The Rcpc distinguishes the following four types of national entities:12 
1. The ‘competent authority’ (Art. 3, sub. c) – being any public authority within a 
Member State having responsibility to enforce ‘the laws that protect consumers’ 
interests’. In the Netherlands, the main competent authority is the newly created 
Consumer Authority, but, as will be shown below, some competences rest with other, 
already existing, public supervisory authorities. 
2. The ‘single liaison office’ (Art. 3, sub. d in conjunction with Art. 4, par. 1) – this 
stands for the public authority in each Member State which is uniquely designated as 
being responsible for coordinating the application of the Rcpc within that Member 
State. In the Netherlands this authority rests (exclusively) with the Consumer 
Authority.13 
3. Possible ‘other public authorities’ (Art. 4, Para. 2) – refers to the fact that other public 
offices, apart from the ones under 1 and 2, may be involved in supervisory and 
enforcement activities as addressed in the Rcpc, not on the basis of competences 
derived from the Rcpc, but on the basis of their already nationally attributed 
competences. 
4. ‘Bodies having a legitimate interest in the cessation or prohibition of intra-Community 
infringements’ (Art. 4, Para. 2) – points to a similar involvement, but in this case by 
an entity outside ‘public office’.  
 
The competent authority (as described under 1.) may, upon a request for assistance 
from an authority of another Member State, instruct a designated civil law body, ‘to take 
all necessary enforcement measures available to it under national law to bring about the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Union Consumer Protection, 2.10.2001, COM(2001) 531 final (laying the foundations for the Rcpc) see 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2001/com2001_0531en01.pdf. See also pp. 2 and 3 (nos. 4-7) of the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Rcpc, 18.7.2003, COM(2003) 443 final (hereinafter referred to as E.M.(Rcpc)). 
For a general comment see the opinion of the European Consumer Law Group; ECLG/021/04 – April 2004; 
http://212.3.246.142/1/AEHJHKEDKNLHMBMHBOCFJOFBPDBK9DWYPY9DW3571KM/BEUC/docs/DLS/2004-
01121-01-E.pdf. 
6 First mentioned in Art. 2, Para. 1 Rcpc, and elaborated in Chapters II and III of the Rcpc 
7 Art. 8, Par. 2 Rcpc – see also Art. 15, Par. 2 Rcpc. 
8 Art. 6, Par. 2 and Art. 8, Par. 2 Rcpc, as well as Art. 8, Par. 3 Rcpc (see also in the below) 
9 E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 5, p. 2. 
10 Article 3, sub. b Rcpc describes an intra-Community breach as any act or omission contrary to the laws that 
protect consumers’ interests, as defined in the regulations and transposed directives referred to in Article 3, 
under a Rcpc (as listed in the Annex), ‘that harms, or is likely to harm, the collective interests of consumers 
residing in a Member State or Member States other than the Member State where the act or omission 
originated or took place; or where the responsible seller or supplier is established; or where evidence or assets 
pertaining to the act or omission are to be found. 
11 See also the (Dutch) Explanatory Memorandum to the AECP (E.M.(AECP0), supra note 4, p. 8. 
12 Provisions with regard to the communications between national authorities and between these authorities, 
Member States and the Commission will be further discussed below. 
13 Art. 2.3, Para. 1 AECP, supra note 4. 
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cessation or prohibition of the intra-Community infringement on behalf of the requested 
authority.’14 Note that the Rcpc expands on Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interests and this directive includes the possibility for 
transboundary class actions, as implemented in the Netherlands in Article 305c CLC.  
 
2.2.On a comparative note 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Rcpc acknowledges that the introduction of the 
Rcpc will require some changes to the enforcement rules in Member States. It states that 
‘Clearly (…) some Member States will be more affected than others will. A large majority 
of Member States and acceding countries nevertheless have public authorities with 
specific. Different to the Rcpc-memorandum,15 the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
AECP offers some consolation in offering a concise overview of some basic aspects of the 
legal regimes for consumer protection in 10 Member States.16 It goes beyond the scope 
of this paper to individually present and discuss these national choices. The most 
relevant conclusions from that overview – and any further investigation - for the 
purposes of this contribution are: 
• that in a number of states a consumer agency (at least similar to and certainly 
suitable for adjustment to the requirements of the Rcpc) existed prior to the 
introduction of the Rcpc - in others, as noted in the Rcpc, such a public authority had 
to be introduced or specifically designated; 
• that where consumer authorities do exist, sometimes they operate as an independent 
agency and sometimes under the political responsibility of a minister (vis-à-vis 
parliament). Numerically, the independent agencies are roughly in balance with the 
subordinate authorities; 
• that in a number of cases the supervision and enforcement of consumer protection 
law is, organisationally speaking, combined with the supervision and enforcement of 
competition law (such as in the UK, France and Italy) – in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Rcpc the option of combining competences in both fields is 
propagated for those Member States that already have a public Competition Authority 
but lack a consumer authority as such.17  Across the Member States substantive law 
ranges from civil and administrative law to criminal law. In most countries effective 
enforcement, in the case of obstruction by the offender, lies with the courts. Clearly 
most (existing) authorities distance themselves from individual complaints, and focus 
on collective infringements and on the possibility of (support for) class actions. 
In the following we will see how the Dutch legislator responded to this spectrum of 
options on different counts.  
 
2.3. The AECP (Act on Enforcement of Consumer Protection) 
 
Backdrop 
The introduction of the Dutch Consumer Authority is part of a re-evaluation of consumer 
protection in the Netherlands. In that sense the AECP is not just an implementation of 
the Rcpc, but also a response to the deficiencies within the existing legal framework for 
consumer protection. The Explanatory Memorandum to the draft AECP stipulates three 
grounds for this re-evaluation:1832 
• a strong market should be matched by a strong government; 
• major gaps in the legal fabric of existing consumer protection; 
• implementing the Rcpc. 
Unfortunately, there is no further elucidation of the opinion that strong markets should 
be matched by strong governments, so we are left to assume that the Dutch government 
                                                
14 See Art. 8, Para. 3 Rcpc, supra note 3. This instruction is not a transferral of competences – see ECLG, supra 
note 5, pp. 3-4. 
15 The choice of a public consumer authority is addressed in E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 5, pp. 7-8, and will be 
further discussed below. 
16 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 13-15. 
17 E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 5, under no. 36. As we will see, the Dutch government did not share this point of 
view. 
18 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 2. 
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considers this ground to be ‘self-evident’. The argumentation that is given in relation to 
the second ground may, however, shed some light on this point. 
The gaps or deficiencies in existing consumer protection law that the Dutch government 
considers most serious, relate to consumer complaints of a collective nature.19 It finds 
that a public law response to these collective breaches of consumer protection will benefit 
the workings of the markets and thus contribute to economic growth,20 even though 
public supervision should and should only intervene where the market fails to effectively 
solve conflicts concerning consumer interests through self-regulatory or civil law 
mechanisms for dispute settlement.21 If the market fails to deal with collective 
infringements, the government should be sufficiently equipped, such as through a public 
supervisor, to act unilaterally and decisively – there’s the strong government against the 
market! 
The implementation of the Rcpc may not be the only but it is, however, the prime 
objective behind the AECP, especially the establishment of the national Consumer 
Authority, as its ‘piece de resistance’. 22 The Dutch government has chosen the option of 
creating a new authority,23 because the already existing supervisory agencies focus on 
sectoral legislation, such as telecommunications24 and financial services,25 whereas 
consumer protection requires a more general supervisor. Furthermore, the existing public 
authorities fulfil a task that is a poor match for consumer protection, as is considered to 
be the case with the Netherlands Competition Authority.26 
 
Framework 
The AECP offers a new supervisory framework with the Dutch Consumer Authority as its 
main competent authority (Art. 3 under c and Art. 4, Para. 1). Initially, this authority will 
be a division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, operating under ministerial supervision 
and responsibility. Ultimately, four years after the establishment of the Authority, an 
evaluation will be made, in order to decide whether the Authority should be converted 
into an independent agency.27 
Five other, already existing Dutch supervisory agencies are also designated as competent 
authorities, with the obligation to execute competences from the Rcpc, in as far as they 
are explicitly assigned to them in the draft AECP. These agencies are: the Netherlands 
Authority for the Financial Markets, the Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate, the Dutch 
Media Authority and the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. Whenever one of 
these (other) authorities is competent to enforce the pertinent regulations, the Consumer 
Authority is not.28 Three already existing supervisory authorities have been designated as 
‘other public authorities’ (see Art. 4, Para. 2 of Rcpc): the Dutch Health Care Authority, 
the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority and the Netherlands 
Competition Authority belong to this group. In the case of a concurrence of competences 
(Article 4.2 of the Rcpc) the draft AECP gives priority to the existing ‘other authority’ to 
respond to the breach of consumer protection law. Finally, the draft AECP allows for the 
                                                
19 According to the Memorandum, research shows that in the Netherlands, during the years 2001-2003, 
approximately 10,000 complaints from individuals were lodged with private complaints organisations, 
concerning (mainly) collective breaches of consumer law – breaches involving an open group of consumers. The 
Dutch government feels that these numbers show that in the cases involved the individual protection of 
consumers’ interests is insufficient. Furthermore, collective breaches require more attention as they disrupt the 
market and distort equal competition. 
20 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 2-3. 
21 Ibid., pp. 6 and 25. 
22 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 3. 
23 Art. 4 Rcpc, supra note 3, leaves it to the Member States to decide whether to create a new entity or to 
assign the new tasks and competences to an existing entity. 
24 The OPTA: the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority. 
25 The AFM: the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets. 
26 The NMa: the Netherlands Competition Authority. This is in contrast to, inter alia, the British Office of Fair 
Trading, which combines supervision in both areas. 
27 Art. 9.2, Para. 2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26. 
28 This follows from the fact that the draft AECP distinguishes between sets of rules and regulations that are to 
be enforced specifically by the Consumer Authority or by any of the other competent authorities (see a-h in the 
annex: the Dutch Consumer Authority is only competent concerning a and b; the other competent authorities 
are competent concerning c-h). 
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possibility to designate ‘bodies having a legitimate interest in the cessation or prohibition 
of intra-Community infringements’ (as mentioned in Art. 4, Para. 2 of the Rcpc). 
 
Non-discrimination and extraterritorial competences 
The Rcpc is aimed at enforcing laws that have been enacted to prohibit intra-Community 
collective infringements of consumer interests. Hence the AECP is limited to that scope, 
with the exception of the competence of the Consumer Authority to (also) act against 
relevant infringements of a non-transboundary nature – Article 2.2 AECP (so as to avoid 
discrimination in terms of enforcement effectiveness concerning national and intra-
Community transactions.29 Article 1.1, sub. m AECP ensures, that the Dutch Consumer 
Authority has the competence also to apply foreign law so as to enable adequate 
responses to requests for mutual assistance. Naturally, the aforementioned ‘broadened 
competence’ of the Consumer Authority only extends to Dutch consumer law. 
 
Private versus public governance 
EC consumer protection law as referred to in the Rcpc has been largely implemented in 
the Netherlands in the Civil Code (CLC), enforcement being a matter for the civil courts. 
Dutch consumer protection law is originally based on the view that, through and within 
the law, the consumer himself should be able to enter into a contract and, if necessary, 
to protect his rights, if need be by resorting to the courts. Furthermore, consumer 
organisations (as ‘bodies with a legitimate interest..’), either of Dutch origin or from 
abroad, have the power to start a class action on the basis of Article 305a and Article 
3:305c of the Dutch Civil Code (CC), demanding – if necessary before the courts – that 
the consumer rights which they protect be upheld. Finally, the Netherlands consumer law 
system knows is underpinned by numerous instances of self-regulation, such as 
procedures for out-of-court dispute settlement (also known as ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’)30 and the joint formulation of general sales conditions. 
The Dutch government has taken the view that the obligation to establish a consumer 
authority does not necessitate a change to the existing civil law and self-regulatory 
provisions and arrangements. In fact, the opinion was clearly ventilated that, where 
private consumers are able to manage their own affairs, public law supervision should 
not interfere – a stance that is referred to as ‘subsidiarity’.31 The responsibility for proper 
conduct primarily rests with the consumers and traders (suppliers, providers and sellers) 
themselves and should not be shifted to the consumer authority. This authority should 
only be called into action when collective consumers’ interests are infringed and the 
system of civil law enforcement is unable to generate an effective response.32 
 
Dual system 
Hence the introduction of public law provisions for the supervision and enforcement of 
civil consumer law (embedded in the Civil Code) is enshrined in the AECP as a ‘dual 
system’. This is seen as an inevitable consequence of the Rcpc, especially in view of the 
the types of responses and sanctions that Article 4, Para. 6 of the Rcpc prescribes as the 
necessary supervisory and enforcement competences of the relevant authority:33 the 
right of access to information, to be supplied with information on demand, the right of 
on-site inspections, to request that an infringement be terminated, to obtain from the 
seller or supplier an undertaking to cease the infringement (and to have this published), 
to require the cessation or prohibition of an infringement (and to publish the resulting 
decisions) and to require payments for non-compliance. These competences are 
                                                
29 As to the other authorities, their existing competences should already suffice for the protection of national 
transactions – and thus there should be no danger of discrimination; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 5. 
30 Alternative dispute settlement is an issue that is also supported by the EU; e.g. Commission Recommendation 
of 4 April 2001, OJ 2001 L 109/56, containing common criteria for consensual out-of-court procedures; the 
Proposal for a directive on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, 22.10.2004, 
COM(2004) 718 final; and services such as the European Consumers Centre’s network (ECC-Net: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/redress/ecc_network/index_en.htm). 
31 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6. 
32 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6 and pp. 25 and 28. There is more on this issue in the below. 
33 See also Art. 4, Para. 3 Rcpc, supra note 3. 
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described as rights which can either be exercised by the authority itself (subject to the 
possibility of a judicial review), or by requesting an injunction from a competent court of 
law. 
At the same time the Dutch government chose to create a new civil procedure to enable 
the new ConsumerAuthority to enforce civil law consumer protection by requesting an 
injunction at the civil courts. The alternative, appealing to the administrative courts, 
could lead to conflicting interpretations between the civil and administrative courts 
concerning specific concepts in the Civil Code. Although initially it was felt that 
administrative enforcement sanctions would not fit in with the protection of individual 
rights in the legal relationship between consumers and traders – as administrative 
sanctions only create a relationship between the Authority and the trader34 - the draft 
AECP was amended to also bestow upon the Consumer Authority general administrative 
law sanction (whether or not upon request), aside from its specific administrative 
sanctioning powers on the basis of (existing and future) administrative law consumer 
protection, such as provisions in the Prices Act (Prijzenwet; offering, amongst other 
provisions, a legal basis for prescriptions on the clarity of price lists).35 These sanctions 
are up for appeal at an administrative court. Administrative law instruments also apply 
when the Consumer Authority involved in merely supervisory activities, such as the 
above-mentioned access to information or on-site inspections. 
 
On balance 
It seems as if the Dutch government has ‘turned necessity into virtue’ when 
implementing the Rcpc. The need to design a ‘competent authority’,36 provided with 
appropriate competences, was combined with filling the gaps in consumer protection law, 
especially with regard to collective breaches. As a consequence a dual system has come 
into existence in which public responsibility and public law instruments are added to an 
existing, primarily civil law and self regulatory enforcement system. Furthermore, the 
Consumer Authority37 almost seems like a spider in a web of authorities and private 
organisations. One part of this web is the European network of national consumer 
authorities; another part is the web in which the Consumer Authority must coordinate 
and fine-tune its activities with other national supervisory authorities and with national 
bodies with a legitimate interest. 
So, again, the question will be whether this web and the powers allocated provide a basis 
for effective (and efficient) supervision, or whether the result stands to pose a threat to 
(transparent) accountability and public enforcement pushing out private. 
 
 
3. Characterising the Dutch Consumer Authority 
3.1. Core tasks & competences 
 
Enforcement, supervision & sanctioning 
Supervision and enforcement are the core activities of the Rcpc-Consumer Authorities.38 
Both activities serve to uphold regulation, which in consumer protection law is mostly laid 
down in statutes (in the Netherlands mainly in the Civil Code), in statutory orders and, 
within the scale of individual legal relations, in administrative acts and contracts 
(including policy guidelines and general clauses).  
In this paper we define supervision as the whole of activities employed to determine 
whether a certain conduct infringes existing regulations. The term Enforcement 
encapsulates all mechanisms (including supervision!) which aim to ensure compliance 
with existing regulations. Taken in a more restricted sense, enforcement is about 
                                                
34 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6-7. 
35 See also Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer 
protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, OJ 1998 L80/27. 
36 Art. 3, under c Rcpc, supra note 3. 
37 This authority was already established prior to the acceptance of the AECP. See the letter by the 
Undersecretary of Economic Affairs of 1 December 2005. 
38 Information exchange may be considered as a third activity – see, amongst others, Arts. 6 and 7 Rcpc, supra 
note 3. 
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sanctioning unlawful behaviour, with the aim being to punish or to remedy, and to 
compensate or remove the (causes of) infringements of existing rules. 
 
When consumer authorities are organised independently from ministerial powers, they 
seem to fit the term regulators. The White Paper on Good European Governance refers to 
these as, ‘A range of (…) agencies (…) in areas with a need for consistent and 
independent regulatory decisions’.39 Their powers may extend well beyond supervisory 
activities.40 Verhey & Verheij found that Dutch regulators come equipped with 
administrative powers (to regulate, especially by individual administrative acts, such as 
licences), with powers to issue rules (for laying down generally binding norms or policy 
guidelines), powers to settle disputes (generally as an optional feature for reaching an 
out-of-court settlement) and other powers (especially to issue non-binding rulings, 
comments or recommendations or to give advice and present reports on the basis of 
research, investigations or inspections).41 Matching impressions of an increasing number 
and variety of powers in the hands of regulators may be found in the case of European 
agencies.42 For the time being, the Dutch Consumer Authority only holds powers of 
supervision and sanctioning, both under control of the courts.43 The only power to set 
general rules is that of setting policy guidelines on the use of these specific competences, 
and certainly for the time being, this power will rest with the minister.44 
 
3.2. Compliance supervision 
The activities of the Consumer Authority focus on proper adherence to rules of conduct 
by citizens and companies within the market.45 Although there may be an interface, we 
need to separate this type of compliance supervision from competition supervision (in 
general terms, aimed at safeguarding fair trade in general, and more specifically, aimed 
at enhancing the process of the liberalisation of a specific branch of public services.46 The 
Consumer Authority is active in supervision of market players’ conduct, aimed at 
ensuring that market transactions are carried out in conformity with relevant rules of 
conduct. Apart from consumer transactions (as discussed here), financial services 
(savings, loans, insurances and investments) also fall within this category (but in The 
Netherlands are left to the supervision of the Financial Markets Authority. 
Regulations concerning consumer protection are likely to concern: (a) the need for 
transparency or proper information; (b) freedom of choice, having a real choice and 
being able to switch from one service provider to another; (c) fair trade, reasonable 
prices and sales conditions and the absence of obligatory package sales; (d) possibilities 
                                                
39 White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428 final, OJ 2001 C 287/1, pp. 23-24. 
40 Such as the right to inspect goods, to search a house or to demand information 
41 L.F.M. Verhey and N. Verheij, ‘De macht van de marktmeester, Markt toezicht in constitutioneel perspectief’, 
Handelingen NJV, 2005-I, Deventer 2005, pp. 135-332 (The power of market regulators. Market supervision in 
a constitutional perspective), especially pp. 157-162. 
42 See Van Ooik, R., ‘The growing importance of agencies in the EU: shifting governance and the institutional 
balance’, in: D.M. Curtin and R.A. Wessel (eds.), Good Governance and the European Union, Reflections on 
concepts, institutions and substance, Antwerp 2005, pp. 125-152;supra note 54, p. 126 and pp. 142-144. 
Examples are: the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM; Regulation 40/94/EC of 20 December 
1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO; 
Regulation 2100/94/EC of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety, OJ 1994 L 227/1), the European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA; Regulation 2309/93/EEC of 22 July 1993 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary 
use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, OJ 1994 L 214/1) and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA; Regulation 1592/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation 
Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 240, p. 1). 
43 Administrative orders (ex post facto) fall within the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Of course to get an 
injunction requires ex ante court order. 
44 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26. 
45 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 41, pp. 146-147 (with references). 
46 In the Netherlands general competition supervision rests with the Netherlands Competition Authority. Specific 
supervision rests with specific agencies for specific areas: the Independent Post and Telecommunications 
Authority (OPTA), the Directorate for Supervision in Energy Affairs (DTe) and The Dutch Health Care Authority 
(NZa). Ideally, once liberalisation has been completed, this type of supervision should cease and only the 
general competition supervision should remain. 
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for complaints and compensation and access to reliable tribunals. Supervision by 
consumer authorities will certainly have to address the above issues, especially under (a-
c) and possibly under (d). In some countries, however, such as the United Kingdom and 
Italy, the legislator has seen fit to combine supervision of market players’ conduct with 
general competition supervision.47  
 
Principles of supervision 
In a 2005 Dutch central government White paper on supervision, six principles of good 
supervision were presented.48 How do they match with the positioning, tasks and powers 
of the Consumer authority? First the principles: 
• selectivity (if possible, the government should leave supervision and enforcement to 
civil society and restrict itself to offering a safety net);  
• decisiveness (supervision should be effective); 
• cooperation (putting limits on the burden of supervision by improved cooperation 
between the manifold supervisors);  
• independency (acting in a trustworthy fashion and independent from political or other 
partisan opinions or interests);  
• transparency (giving reasons for supervisory policies and activities and applying 
openness);  
• professionalism (on each level of supervision: the individual supervisor, the 
supervisory agency and the occupational group; integrity, coherence and improving 
competences are the key criteria). 
If we apply these principles to the Dutch Consumer Authority at least four important 
questions arise: 
1. the (Explanatory Memorandum to the) AECP advocates that the Authority will operate 
(selectively) as a ‘safety net’. The main question will be whether the Authority will be 
able to restrict itself to this role if and when intra-Community trade increases and if 
and when private parties appeal on the Authority to apply its administrative legal 
sanctions? 
2. will the cooperation, which is envisaged in agreements between the Dutch Consumer 
Authority and other public supervisors and private legitimate bodies, create sufficient 
trust among the players and with the consumers to avoid a supervisory ‘Babylon’? 
3. similarly, will the new system of a European network and national networks create 
sufficient transparency to sustain trust but also to have clarity on accountability (for 
policy choices) so as to underpin effective and efficient operations? 
4. finally, will the Authority be able to operate independently or is ministerial influence 
unavoidable given the vulnerability of the national supervisory network and the 
liability of the state vis-à-vis the Community (and how will this affect the quest for 
professionalism)? 
Clearly these questions require answers, although some may only prove to be 
answerable in practice and over time.  
 
4. Governing supervision 
Our main question, at the start of this paper was whether the Consumer Authority’s 
strategic position in supervisory ‘networking’ and a ‘flexible response’ to infringements of 
(EC) consumer law, isn’t in effect hampering transparency and thus accountability, and if 
‘vertical’ public law remedies aren’t pushing out ‘horizontal’ private or self regulatory 
solutions.  
In effect these are two, albeit intertwined, questions.  
a. Are we, on the one hand, witnessing a shift in supervisory governance from self 
regulatory, private law supervision (by nature in symmetrical and reciprocal patterns) 
                                                
47 It goes beyond the scope of this article to determine which internal arrangements have possibly been put into 
place to separate the treatment of these different domains. 
48 BZK Policy Paper, issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties), Minder Last,meer effect. Zes principes van goed toezicht. (Less of a burden, improved 
effectiveness; six principles of good supervision), October 2005. Presented by the Minister of the Interior on 12 
October 2005. p. 18. 
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to (coercive and unilateral patterns of) public law, and does this merely amount to 
public law instruments being added to the supervisory ‘tool box’ or is public law 
pushing out private law, so that we must evaluate the introduction of the Consumer 
Authority as effectively a publitisation of consumer law supervision. 
b. Are we, on the other hand, witnessing a shift in supervisory governance from direct 
and individual (legally empowered) responsiveness (as in an injunction for cessation, 
redress or compensation of damages) to indirect responsiveness through public-
private networks  (through ‘custodian entities’) and how does this effect supervision 
in terms of (transparent) accountability (Who is responsible for which action; who 
acts first?) in terms of new communicative ‘strategy-building’ between public and 
private ‘custodians’ and matching supervisory tactics? 
Both questions also touch on effectiveness: is public better than private, how does 
subsidiarity work in the dual system and are networks more adequate in their 
responsivity to infringements? In causal terms multi-level aspects (as in the new 
European network of public law Authorities) and Multi-actor aspect (as in the national 
public-private networks of ‘custodians’) are here assumed to have an impact on existing 
national arrangements of civil law and self-regulatory enforcement, but may also place 
the Consumer Authority in a ‘splits’ (to be responsive to the minister or to the European 
Commission, or to private entities in the national context). 
  
 
 
4.1. Coordination between public and private law 
 
The European (Rcpc) perspective 
The Rcpc offers little guidance as to the question of the division between civil law and 
public law in the area of consumer protection law. In the Explanatory Memorandum, 
however, some remarks are made on the question of why a network of public authorities 
is deemed to be necessary.49 
First of all, the competences involved in supervising and enforcing Community consumer 
protection law (i.e. investigatory and sanctioning powers) need to be unilaterally binding. 
Furthermore, the use of these powers will require guaranteed confidentiality and 
professional secrecy.50 The Memorandum also presents public authorities as having a 
proven reputation for speedy, efficient, effective and comprehensive enforcement, which 
is considered an important deterrent to rogue traders.51 Impartiality and accountability 
are presented as being more effective when authorities act in the public interest than 
when supervision and enforcement are left to private entities. Furthermore, mutual 
assistance depends upon reciprocal rights and obligations (ensuring effective protection 
in cross-boundary situations) and reciprocity warrants equivalent public authorities in 
each Member State: ‘The mutual assistance rights provided in the regulation should 
therefore only be entrusted to public authorities.’52 Private bodies can play their part, but 
primarily with regard to domestic consumers. 
Secondly, the Memorandum ascertains that a large majority of the Member States have 
recognised ‘the value of a public dimension to their enforcement systems’, and it builds 
on this to present the creation of a network of public consumers’ authorities at the EU 
level as a necessary assurance for Member States to adopt, in the future, the maximum 
harmonisation of consumer protection laws (such as the directive on unfair commercial 
practices) – because ‘consumers will be protected by equally effective public authorities 
when shopping cross-border’.53 This point is also reiterated with regard to the 
enlargement of the internal market, since the proposed regulation is said to be an 
opportunity to ensure effective enforcement in the new Member States. 
                                                
49 E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 2, p. 7-8. 
50 E.M. (Rcpc), supra note 5, under no. 34. 
51 Ibid.; stating that there is proof that some rogue traders already exploit the gaps in countries without public 
enforcement. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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Finally, the Memorandum reminds us,54 that because its scope is limited to cross-border 
infringements, the regulation does not compel Member States to change their 
arrangements for domestic infringements. Furthermore, new public authorities are not 
necessarily required in those Member States that currently lack such authorities, because 
the limited responsibilities of the regulation could be given to existing public authorities – 
for instance to public authorities responsible for the enforcement of competition law 
matters.55 
Clearly, the Rcpc presents a confident choice for public supervision, but it also allows for 
a continuation of existing domestic civil law and self-regulatory systems of consumer 
protection law. 
 
The Dutch (AECP) perspective 
Enforcing consumer protection law in the Netherlands was primarily a civil law domain, in 
which the consumer himself is considered capable of protecting his own rights, if need be 
in an out-of-court procedure, or in the civil courts. Furthermore, private ‘bodies with a 
legitimate interest’ may engage in self-regulatory cooperation with (organisations of) 
traders, for instance in adopting general sales conditions, and they may also commence a 
civil law class action.  
The Dutch legislator has adopted the Rcpc-view that the obligation to establish a 
consumer authority does not necessitate a change in the existing civil law and self-
regulatory provisions and arrangements. Subsidiarity is the key and public supervision 
should be regarded as a safety net. Hence, a dual system was designed to ensure that 
(European and additionally national) public law requirements are met (especially the 
responses and sanctions prescribed in the Rcpc), without disturbing the existing fabric of 
civil consumer law – or rather, expanding on civil law by creating a new civil injunction 
procedure (Art. 305d CLC).56  
As presented in the above the Dutch Consumer Authority only enforces consumer 
protection law as listed under a. and b. of the AECP Annex – see Article 2.2, Para. 1 
AECP. This annex lists both the relevant regulations and directives and concerning the 
latter also the statutes by which these directives were implemented: 
• The regulations under a., which are all directives, have been implemented in the CLC 
and are enforced through civil law means, such as the new and speedy civil procedure 
of a request for an injunction (Art. 2.5) and the right to request a civil court to 
declare that agreements on class compensation for damages (to which the Dutch 
Consumer Authority is a party) are generally binding.57 The main subjects of civil law 
protection are misleading advertising, travel arrangements, general sales conditions, 
time-sharing arrangements, distant sales, consumer sales and guarantees and, 
finally, e-commerce. 
• The regulations under b., again only directives, are implemented in public law 
statutes: the Act on door-to-door or street sales (or hawking) and the Prices Act. 
These can only be enforced through administrative law enforcement; on demand for 
mutual assistance with regard to an intra-Community breach of consumer protection 
law (Art. 2.7, Para. 3).58 The main administrative instruments are: the administrative 
order subject to a penalty (Art. 2.8), the administrative penalty (Art. 2.9) and the 
public announcement on the use of one or both of these sanctions,59 and of refraining 
from such use on the basis that an undertaking by the trader has been agreed upon 
                                                
54 Ibid., under no. 35. 
55 Ibid., under no. 36; the Memorandum goes on to say that there is a possible positive synergy between the 
consumer protection and competition dimensions of market surveillance and enforcement. 
56 See Art. 8.1 draft AECP, supra note 4. An administrative procedure was rejected due to the fear of diverging 
interpretations of CLC provisions. 
57 Chapter 2, § 2 AECP (civil law enforcement). See also E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 17 and p. 33-34. 
58 See E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 17 and Para. 5.2, p. 31-33. See also Chapter 2, § 3 AECP (Administrative 
Law enforcement), supra note 4. 
59 Because the one sanction is retributive and the other punitive, Dutch administrative law determines that they 
can be applied simultaneously. 
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(Art. 2.16).60 Note that the administrative law supervisory competences apply 
generally, regardless of whether a (suspected) infringement concerns civil or public 
consumer protection law. 
In drafting the AECP the Dutch government decided, on appeal from a parliamentary 
majority, to extend the list of Annex b. also to those civil law provisions that may be 
considered sufficiently precise (in wording) and hold an unconditional order or 
prohibition; effectively extending the administrative law sanctions onto the domain of 
substantive private law,61 albeit only in cases where an infringement of a substantive 
provision is easily concluded (as, for example, in requirements concerning traders/sellers 
providing information, sales on distance, e-commerce, package tours, and time sharing). 
Infringements of more open norms should be left to the civil courts to decide upon.62 To 
this end Chapter 8, holding specific types of such clear and unconditional norms, was 
added to the draft AECP, and the abovementioned annex was amended hitherto. 
 
The dual system, albeit no longer as pure as originally drafted, preserves the existing 
system of mainly civil law consumer protection (through self-regulation), while adding 
instruments for intra-Community infringements. The Consumer Authority is built, as the 
Explanatory Memorandum puts it,63 on a ‘civil foundation’. Apart from individual 
consumers being considered capable to stand up for their own rights, this foundation is 
underpinned by consumers organising themselves (or being organised), such as in the 
Consumers’ Association (Consumentenbond). Together with organisations representing 
traders, these consumers’ organisations have adopted self-regulatory arrangements and 
organisations, such as the Dutch Advertising Code Foundation and the Consumer 
Complaints Foundation,64 which are important players in dealing with consumers’ 
complaints. Furthermore, the consumer organisations, as ‘bodies with a legitimate 
interest’ may commence class actions in the case of a collective infringement of 
consumer protection law. 
As a consequence of the aforementioned subsidiarity principle, The Consumer Authority 
may, apart from a case in which a request for mutual assistance was made, only act: (1) 
in the case of collective breaches of consumer protection law and (2) when the market 
seems incapable of enforcing consumer protection law through self-regulation or civil 
procedures.65 Especially the second requirement, which expresses the subsidiarity 
principle, requires some mode of cooperation between the Consumer Authority and the 
domain of private (collective consumer) initiatives. To this effect the AECP offers three 
important public-private arrangements: 
• Firstly, the AECP facilitates, in Article 6.1, the adoption of so-called cooperation 
protocols for bilateral agreements between, on the one hand, the Consumer Authority 
and, on the other, consumers’ organisations and joint organisations of consumers and 
traders (such as the previously mentioned foundations). These protocols may be 
about offering information to consumers (referring to proper information offices), 
dispute settlement, making use of the instrument of class actions and the (new) 
injunction request procedure, as well as exchanging information on new 
developments and trends.66 
• Secondly, the AECP obliges (in Article 6.3) the Consumer Authority to set up 
institutionalised social deliberations, at least once every three months, with 
organisations representing consumers and traders, as a means to coordinate the 
Consumer Authority’s task of executing the AECP with private initiatives and to 
exchange information about developments and trends relevant to consumer 
protection. Apart from their direct practical use, these deliberations are considered an 
                                                
60 If an infringement is of a strictly domestic nature, the enforcement instruments of the particular statute apply 
– see Art. 2.17, par. 3 AECP, supra note 4. 
61 Letter by the undersecretary of Economic Affairs,  van 27 June 2006, Parliamentary documents, nr. 17. 
62 Parliamentary documents, nr. 18, Second Notice of Amendments. Note that the requirements of Art. 7 ECRM 
also apply. 
63 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 28 and p. 47. 
64 http://www.reclamecode.nl/indexengels.html  and http://www.sgc.nl/  
65 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 28 and p. 47. 
66 Ibid (also p. 49). 
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important aspect of providing accountability towards stakeholders; not only should 
the Consumer Authority be accountable through the mechanism of ministerial 
responsibility, but also – in terms of good governance – through public 
accountability.67 
• Thirdly and finally, but this time within the scope of mutual assistance, as proposed in 
Article 8, Para. 3 Rcpc, the competent authorities may decide to involve ‘legitimate 
bodies’ in the process of mutual assistance. Art. 6.2 AECP takes up this ‘challenge’ by 
allowing for the possibility of designating such bodies by statutory order (as in the 
case of the private Dutch Advertising Code Foundation).68. Thus, the subsidiarity 
principle can also operate under mutual assistance, albeit that the competences of 
the competent authority will remain in place should the ‘legitimate body’ fail in its 
response to the request (see also Article 8, Para. 3, final phrase Rcpc).69 
As these arrangements give operational meaning to the subsidiarity principle, they will 
provide the underpinning for the balance between the use of civil law instruments by 
private parties as against the use by the Consumer Authority of its administrative 
powers. When subsidiarity prevails, civil law instruments, in the hands of private parties, 
will also prevail; once a Consumer Authority intervention is considered unavoidable, the 
choice of instruments depends on the nature of the regulations that the rogue trader has 
(probably) infringed. Clearly, when a request for mutual supervisory assistance has been 
made, the likelihood of administrative law instruments being used increases. Firstly, it 
may well prove difficult for a branch organisation to design self regulatory, yet binding 
mechanisms that commit individual traders to provide information. Secondly, once the 
Consumer Authority does have to step in, it will only have administrative law supervisory 
instruments at its disposal. 
 
In conclusion; towards publitisation? 
While preparing the draft AECP, the full-publitisation of Dutch consumer protection law 
was considered as an alternative to the dual system.70 All public and civil consumer 
protection law would be enforced by administrative law. A clear advantage would have 
been that all supervision and enforcement would be ‘in one pair of hands’. It would have 
required, however, a full regulatory overhaul – transposing all civil law remedies into 
administrative legislation. Furthermore, full-publitisation would end the benefits of the 
existing predominantly civil law and self regulatory system (vide ‘the private 
foundation’). Finally, such a fundamental transformation would pose a considerable risk 
of having both the civil courts and the administrative courts interpreting and applying 
concepts and provisions of the Civil Code differently and thus creating legal uncertainty.71 
 
So, the dual system prevailed, and in theory it offers a clear distinction, linked to 
different sets of civil or public consumer protection regulations. Nevertheless, 
parliamentary input already caused to a first crossing of the public-private law divide (as 
Chapter 8 AECP and Annex b. show). Furthermore, in practice, though, the separation of 
regimes may be difficult to manage when intra-Community trade intensifies and, 
subsequently, the number of requests for mutual assistance increases – with more 
speedy transactions through the Internet. Both foreign and domestic partners in 
supervision and enforcement may then expect the Consumer Authority to respond more 
rapidly and with more effective and efficient instruments – if need be with administrative 
orders, even when private consumer law is at stake, or by disregarding possible self-
regulatory options. Much will also depend on ‘public sentiment’; to what extend will the 
public and politicians have sufficient trust in the functioning of the market, especially with 
regard to the integrity (as opposed to opportunism) or traders. If the latter prove or 
                                                
67 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 50. With reference to a report by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy: Visie op markttoezicht (Outlook on market supervision), 18 June 2004, Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 29 
200, no. 50. 
68 Concerning Directive 97/36/EC, OJ 1997 L 202 (Television without frontiers directive). 
69 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 47-48. See also the earlier remark that no competences are transferred. 
70 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
71 Again, under the AECP supervision is exclusively a matter of administrative law. 
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seem to be pushing the barrier, by taking the risk of not being seriously corrected by civil 
law remedies (which only amounts, in the worst case, to compensation of damage), then 
the ‘public’ or ‘political’ response may be that the market as such is corrupted to the 
extend that the meta-public interest of securing the proper functioning of markets may 
lead to more and more administrative law interventions. Faure has pointed at the 
underlying argument for this, by clarifying how, from a law and economics perspective,  
civil law sanctions have a ‘quid pro quo’ character (a ‘one on one’, symmetrical response; 
at a great likelihood, but limited to compensation of damage only), whereas public 
sanctioning is of a more public & programmatic character (of a unilateral kind, based on 
policy priority, at a lower chance of getting caught, but sanctions possibly reaching in 
excess of the damage, but with built-in avoidance of error costs),72 which translate into 
accompanying differences in signals and functions of these responses.   
In four years time, 2 years form now, the functioning of the dual system will be subject 
to an evaluation (Art. 9.2 AECP), also with regard to the cooperation within the domestic 
network. Should the dual enforcement system prove more burdensome than the 
(expected) disadvantages of a transformation into a public law system, then a 
fundamental transformation is still on the cards.73 My hypothesis is that, also dependent 
on the impact of the recent financial crisis and new doubts as to the self regulatory 
abilities of the market and possible increased desire for ensuring market-stability through 
strong government, we will witness a gradual further publitisation of consumer 
supervision.  
 
4.2. Responsibility 
Working in networks 
As to the second question (mainly) on accountability, the new networks of public and 
private partners in supervising and enforcing consumer protection law are the key 
element in the new consumer law supervisory governance structure. Considering the 
three main tasks of the Consumer Authority74 (the single liaison office,75 the main 
supervisory and enforcement authority76 and – outside legal tasks – the Information 
office for consumers and traders),77 the relations with other liaison offices,78 other 
competent authorities,79 other public offices80104 and with legitimate bodies81105 are of 
the utmost importance. In fact, these relations emerge as networks, as there is a 
structural need (within or outside requests for mutual assistance) to coordinate the use 
of supervisory and enforcement powers, as well as to exchange or share information on 
relevant trends and developments in consumer law (practice). 
 
Two types of networks in which the Consumer Authority participates are important here: 
1. Firstly, the European network of public authorities, set up according to rules which 
follow directly from the Rcpc, especially from Articles 6-9 (obligations) and Articles 
11-15 (responsibilities and conditions). 
2. Secondly, several domestic networks with other competent authorities, with other 
public offices and with legitimate bodies. These are regulated in part by provisions of 
the AECP (Art. 2.17, Art. 3.11, Art. 4.3-4 and Art. 6.3),82 and by agreements laid 
down in the previously mentioned cooperation protocols. According to Article 5.1 and 
                                                
72 M. Faure, Onbegrensd toezicht, Justitiele verkenningen 2008/8, p. 84-104. 
73 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 52 (and pp. 72-73). 
74 Ibid., Chapter 4, pp. 24-30. 
75 Art. 3, under d Rcpc, supra note 3, and Art. 2.3, Para. 1 AECP, supra note 4. 
76 Art. 3, under b Rcpc, supra note 3, and Art. 2.2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 30-31. 
77 Ibid., p. 27-28. 
78 Art. 6, 7, 8 and 9 Rcpc, supra note 3. 
79 See also Art. 3.11 AECP (the duty to provide relevant information), supra note 4. All competent authorities 
are under an obligation to respond to requests for mutual assistance – Art. 6-9 Rcpc, supra note 3. The ‘other 
competent authorities’ may also apply their regular, existing enforcement competences. 
80 Art. 4, Para. 2 of Rcpc, supra note 3, and Chapter 3 AECP, supra note 4. In case of concurrence, the sectoral 
competences of the ‘other authorities’ will prevail (as they are considered to offer a higher level of protection) – 
Art. 4.2, Para. 2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 41. 
81 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 27-28. 
82 Required on the basis of Article 11, Paras. 2 and 3 Rcpc, supra note 3. 
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Article 6.1 AECP, nationally these cooperation protocols are to be formulated for 
coordination and cooperation between all the competent authorities, offices and 
bodies, also with regard to the interpretation of certain legal concepts and terms and 
to the application of provisions of consumer protection law.83 
Especially with regard to mutual assistance, but also in other cases of coordinated 
efforts, some measure of agreement will be necessary. Article 4.3 AECP states that on 
the terms and concepts of civil law coordination suffices (as, finally, the courts will 
authoritatively decide on the matters in question); but in the case of terms and concepts 
of administrative law, agreement is necessary (as public office has a primary right of 
interpretation).84 In both cases these joint interpretations will be of great importance to 
the practice of supervision and enforcement.  
 
Taking responsibility 
How will public responsibility for consumer protection be distributed through these 
different networks, especially with regard to positioning the Consumer Authority in a dual 
system operating on the basis of subsidiarity.  
On the one hand, the Consumer Authority is part of a vertical/hierarchical governance 
system, in which public law competences and public responsibility dominate (nationally, 
the Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs and, on the EU level, the European Commission).  
On the other hand, the Consumer Authority takes part in a horizontal/reciprocal 
governance system, in which it interacts in a non-hierarchical manner with other public 
and private supervisors and legitimate bodies, both on the European and on the national 
level. In this hybrid governance context,85 public responsibility needs to be in tune with 
the requirements of subsidiarity and dualism, or with the view that the Consumer 
Authority must provide intra-Community safeguards, whilst at the same time allowing for 
market relations to self regulate consumer-trader relations and to offer an out-of-court 
system for the settlement of conflicts – in other words: subsidiary; limiting its 
interventions to situations of collective market failure. 
 
In two respects attuning (vertical) public responsibility to (horizontal) networking may 
prove difficult.  
• Firstly, how can the Consumer Authority find a balance between operating as a equal 
participant within the ‘horizontal/reciprocal’ national networks (and to take part in, or 
to assist in the workings of the self-regulatory consumer protection system),86 and on 
the other hand being part of the ‘public law regulatory machinery’ (called government 
– operating under ministerial responsibility)? 
• Secondly, how does operating within the European network, under the responsibility 
of the European Commission, coincide with the Consumer Authority’s national ties, 
both under public regime (of government, guided by ministerial guidelines, and of 
networks will other public regulators) and under the private self regulatory network 
system (as part of the ‘public law EU machinery’), adhering to the notions of dualism 
and subsidiary? 
Let us look at these questions separately. 
 
National networks 
As specific competences are attributed to the Dutch Consumer Authority, it will be able to 
act according to its own specific supervisory and enforcement powers, i.e. according to 
its own legal authority.87 Organisationally it belongs to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
                                                
83 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 42-43. 
84 Ibid., p. 43. 
85 This is not the place for an exposure of the views on the concept of governance. For an overview see: Oliver 
Treib, Holger Bähr and Gerda Falkner, ‘Modes of Governance: a note towards conceptual clarification’, European 
Governance papers N-05-02 (ISSN 1813-6826), 17 November 2005, http://www.connex-
network.org/eurogov/. 
86 Reciprocity warrants equivalence or the certainty that none of the parties concerned have an exclusive right 
or power over other parties. 
87 Related to (possible) breaches of only the legislation listed in the Annex – apart from the matter of the 
application of foreign consumer protection law. 
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as a separate division directly under the Secretary-General.88 Thus, on the one hand, the 
Authority has its own powers and is – formally speaking – detached from the policy-
making (regulatory) divisions89 while, on the other hand, full ministerial responsibility 
continues to apply.This allows the minister to issue instructions, not only of a general 
nature (in the form of policy guidelines) but also specific instructions (pertaining to one 
particular case). As for the use of policy guidelines, under Dutch law an administrative 
office (such as the Consumer Authority) is allowed (only) to set these rules aside if in a 
particular case acting in conformity with such a rule would result in a disproportional 
disadvantage.90 Furthermore, the fact that specific supervisory and enforcement 
competences have been assigned to the Consumer Authority, instead of to the minister, 
confirms that the Consumer Authority should be able to act, as far as possible, of its own 
accord, as it also implies that – under Dutch law – the Consumer Authority is allowed to 
also adopt its own policy guidelines. In practice the minister should make full 
responsibility ‘feel’ like limited responsibility.91 
At the same time it should be well understood that all other competences pertaining to 
the Consumer Authority – such as the annual report to the European Commission and the 
signing of cooperation protocols with other supervisors and with legitimate bodies – rest 
explicitly with the minister! That is to say that the willingness to cooperate and the 
conditions for cooperation are to be agreed upon by the minister.92 
So, with regard to operating in horizontal, national networks, we may conclude that the 
boundaries are set by the minister and the use of the Authority’s (own) competences will 
have to be in accordance with certain protocols. Not only for strictly legal reasons, but 
also to avoid the situation where the necessary trust in making these reciprocal networks 
work will be undermined. By the same token, the minister should aim to arrive at 
cooperation protocols that allow for sufficient discretion, so as to offer the Consumer 
Authority sufficient opportunity to create trust within the network. Finding the proper 
balance between regulation and discretion will be a major challenge – in fact regardless 
of whether full or limited ministerial responsibility applies.  
Meanwhile the Consumer Authority has started cooperation with93 other public 
supervisors,94 with private consumer organisations,95 entrepreneurial organisations,96 and 
self regulatory organisations.97 Leading strategy is that the Consumer Authority provides 
so-called ‘2nd-line’ (instance) supervision – in principle only acting if private ‘1st line’, 
sectoral organisations can not rapidly and/or effectively respond,98 or in cases of 
recidivism or to add extra strength to a private response.99 Together with the telecom, 
fair trade and financial markets authorities (OPTA, NMa and AFM) the Consumer 
                                                
88 The highest civil servant within a ministerial department. 
89 With the aim of ensuring its independence and for the sake of transparency. Note that within the Authority 
itself an organisational division will be made between supervision, sanctioning and administrative reviews. See 
E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 28. 
90 In doing so too readily (to the liking of the Minister) the Consumer Authority could be confronted with a 
disciplinary response from the minister; but, legally speaking, the decision taken will still ‘stand’. 
91 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26; especially by refraining from specific instructions (in individual cases). 
92 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 26-27 and pp. 44-45. The protocols with other competent authorities and with 
other public offices will have to be agreed upon with other ministers or with boards of independent government 
agencies. 
93 The following examples are taken from: E.L.M. Vos en S.W. Ammerlaan, De Consumentenautoriteit: 
nieuwkomer op druk speelveld, Justitiële verkenningen 2008/8, p. 66-83, p. 71-72; L.B. Melcherts en E.L.M. 
Vos, De Consumentenautoriteit: het duale stelsel, een overzicht van de handhavingspraktijk, Tijdschrift voor 
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken, 2008/3, p. 96-99. See also the CA-website: 
http://www.consumentenautoriteit.nl/Over_de_Consumentenautoriteit/Samenwerken [Oct. 2008] 
94 NMa, OPTA, AFM, VWA, Commissariaat voor de Media, Inspecties V&W en Gezondheidszorg, NZa, College 
Bescherming persoonsgegevens. 
95 Juridisch Loket/Europees Consumentencentrum, Stichting Geschillencommissies, Consumentenbond en 
Stichting de Ombudsman. 
96 VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland. 
97 Stichting Reclamecode. 
98 J.J.C. Kabel Reclamerecht en Oneerlijke Mededinging – Ontwikkelingen in 2006,  Intellectuele Eigendom & 
Reclamerecht (IER), 2007-4, p. 203-209. 
99 http://www.consumentenautoriteit.nl/Over_de_Consumentenautoriteit/Samenwerken . 
Dual supervisory governance in Consumer Law M.A. Heldeweg NIG November 2008 16 
Authority has started an information portal Consuwijzer,100 in which some private 
organisations also participate. 
 
Responsibility and the European network 
The Rcpc has the legal provisions on mutual assistance and cooperation in the European 
network – in Articles 6-15. In the course of cooperative practice, further, more specific 
conditions for issuing and handling requests for mutual assistance, or for the sake of 
information exchange, may be developed. These informal agreements may interfere with 
both the ministerial influence on the Consumer Authority and with the specific features of 
Dutch consumer protection law (subsidiarity and dualism); indeed all the more so if and 
when the European Commission actively participates in the network (either within or 
outside the boundaries of Arts 16-17 Rcpc). 
On the face of it, the Community’s (or Commission’s) role in this context is limited to 
supporting measures which raise the standard of enforcement generally and which 
improve the ability of consumers to enforce their rights (promoting the exchange of best 
practices).101 The network should be complementary to existing enforcement 
mechanisms.102 Still, setting a course of action in support of cooperation and of the 
coordinated effort of supervision and enforcement may involve exchanges of officials 
between the competent authorities, national actions on information, advice and 
education, consumer representation, the extrajudicial settlement of disputes, access to 
justice and statistics.  
Clearly, agreement on these issues may have a strong effect on the consumer 
authorities’ operations. The Community’s impact could reach even further when partners 
within the network, including the Commission, jointly decide upon the applicability or 
interpretation and application of (intra-)Community consumer law. 
Such a development may give rise to the question whether (nationally) ministerial 
responsibility for the Consumer Authority will still be able to function effectively. This 
question has also arisen in the wake of a number of similar networks that have been 
created over the last decade,103 such as in: telecommunications,104 energy,105 food 
safety,106 monetary policy,107 and general competition supervision.108 In some networks 
the Commission even has the explicit power to take decisions which are binding on 
network participants.109 Although this is not the case in the Consumer Authority’s 
network, the Commission may nevertheless still see fit to present recommendations or 
guidelines, by which the authorities and the Member States have to abide – in view of 
Article 10 EC Treaty (the principle of loyalty). This may well curtail the possibility for a 
minister to (nationally) influence the behaviour of the Consumer Authority by means of 
policy guidelines or otherwise, whilst at the same time Member States may still be held 
liable for the failure, by their own – subordinate – authority, to enforce Community 
legislation.110111 
 
                                                
100 Http://www.consuwijzer.nl  
101 Chapter IV, Art. 16-18 Rcpc, supra note 3; these Articles suggest that substantive matters will be decided 
upon in due course and by the Member States and the Commission jointly – see also: E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 2, 
no. 34 and nos. 44-48. 
102 See the emphasis in opinion of the ECLG, supra note 5, p. 3. 
103 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 41, p. 166. 
104 Commission decision 2002/627/EC, OJ 2002 L 200/37 – amended 2004/641/EC, OJ 2004 L 293/30. 
105 Commission decision 2003/796/EC, OJ 2003 L 296/34 (the European Energy Regulators Group). 
106 Regulation (EC) no. 178/2002 of 28 January 2002, OJ 2002 L 31/1. 
107 The European System of Central Banks; Art. 8 EC Treaty. This system effectively shuts out Member States’ 
influence. 
108 Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, OJ 2003 L 1. See also OJ 2004 C 101. 
109 As in telecommunications; Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ 2002 L 108/33. 
110 See also the BZK Policy Paper, supra note 48, p. 13. 
111 An interesting example of this problem is offered by the case of the regulation on executive agencies 
responsible for managing one or more Community programmes (Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 
December 2002, OJ 2003, L 11/1) – see Van Ooik, supra note 42, pp. 144-145. 
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Furthermore, the possibilities for upholding the typically Dutch system of consumer 
protection (especially subsidiarity and dualism), may come under threat, as a European 
regulation overrules national responsibilities. 
 
Accountability and Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of decision-making in European networks of supervisors, also considering 
the role of the Commission within these networks, may be problematic. Some authors 
even speak of a clear danger that (formally or de facto) independent agencies will 
gradually be ‘sucked out of their national institutional structures’, without there being 
proper democratic compensation within the networks.112 The opportunity to introduce 
horizontal or alternative means of accountability, such as being directly accountable to 
Parliament, stakeholders’ participation,113 and active openness may be worthwhile 
manifestations of ‘good governance’,114 and thus soften democratic vulnerability, but 
they can hardly be expected to offer full compensation.115 
This viewpoint should be taken into consideration when the European Consumers’ 
Network kicks off, especially as a shift towards European dominance may well put 
national attempts at preserving and building upon ‘civil foundations’ at risk.116 The Rcpc 
is presented as a framework that allows for national consumer protection schemes to 
retain their specific characteristics. If this is to be taken seriously, the European network 
definitely needs to restrain itself and, nationally, authorities should ideally operate as 
agencies, as this offers them the opportunity to interact with public and private ‘partners’ 
on a reciprocal basis. Setting the ground rules for such reciprocity and interactions could 
and should remain a ministerial responsibility. This responsibility would serve to uphold 
national choices against possible European policy dominance through the agencies as 
parties to the European network. At the same time this responsibility should not be taken 
up to over-regulate cooperation protocols, as this could easily be seen as placing little 
trust in the Consumer Authority. Smart regulation is clearly required in order to find the 
right balance. 
 
 
5. In conclusion 
How is this new supervisory governance structure of consumer authorities going to 
operate, particularly with regard to the coordination between civil and administrative law 
and the division of responsibility for supervision in a system of dualism and subsidiarity? 
In the above text this leading question has given rise to many elements and aspects, 
questions and possible answers.  
Meanwhile the new system of supervisory governance in consumer protection is two 
years old, and we have some first impressions, albeit mainly from within.117 Cases are 
still limited in number. In some 6 cases an administrative sanction (of a penalty and or 
an order under penalty) was applied,118 in some other cases a threat to sanction had the 
desired effect. At the same time in 2007 the Consumer Authority was corrected over 
being too hasty in applying the naming and shaming sanction.119 Understandably this is a 
learning experience, as is working together with the Stichting Reclame Code (Dutch 
Advertising Code)120 – which also has its alternative procedure for dispute resolution.121 
                                                
112 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 41, pp. 321-322. 
113 With all the dangers of regulatory capture. 
114 The Explanatory Memorandum to the AECP refers to the obligation of ‘institutionalised social deliberations’ 
with organisations of consumers and traders as an important instance of good governance. E.M.(AECP), supra 
note 4, p. 50. 
115 Similarly Verhey and Verheij, supra note 41, p. 252. 
116 See the ECLG insistence, as referred to in note 97. 
117 E.L.M. Vos en S.W. Ammerlaan, supra note 93 (both authors work with the Consumer Authority); L.B. 
Melcherts en E.L.M. Vos, supra note 93 (Melchers worked with the Consumer Authority till April 2008). Note 
that both articles were written as private research.  
118 Vos and Ammerlaan, supra, p. 76-80.  
119 See also, J.J.C. Kabel, supra note 98, in reference to Vz. Rb. Den Haag 8 mei 2007, Pretium Telecom BV v. 
Staat der Nederlanden, LJN: BA4603. 
120 http://www.reclamecode.nl/ . 
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As always, ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating.’ But as yet it still is too early to tell 
whether a proper balance may be found with proper transparency as to accountability 
through the networks and a measure of effectiveness that does indeed comply with 
subsidiarity and dualism (also in terms of avoiding a ‘regulatory overstretch’).122  
 
We may conclude that the Rcpc allows for a dual system and subsidiarity, as introduced 
by the Dutch government. Nonetheless the dual system may well prove to be 
insufficiently resilient in the wake of increasing and speedy intra-Community trading 
implementation, causing pressure to apply a ready ‘administrative fix’ to newly arising 
infringements, surpassing civil law and self-regulatory alternatives, all in neglect of 
subsidiarity. A considerable amount of trust is placed in the ‘good governance’ of the 
relevant networks – and what if our trust in the functioning of the market is 
disappointed…? 
Furthermore, ‘good governance’ may be the stepping-stone to achieve trust, but 
ministerial overregulation or a lack of transparency is the pitfall. If the basic rules for 
taking responsibility and the division of powers to take binding decisions remain unclear 
or offer too little room for the Authority to (reciprocally) involve itself, commitment 
within the networks may fall short of the promise of rapid, efficient and effective 
supervision and enforcement. This in turn may lead to a call for full publitisation of Dutch 
collective consumer protection law – given the requirements set by the European 
Community. 
 
All of the changes caused by the Rcpc will probably serve the intra-Community protection 
of consumer law. There should, however, be serious concern about the likelihood that 
these changes will indeed disrupt those national systems of consumer protection which, 
presently, offer protection through civil law and self-regulation. All the parties concerned, 
the Commission included, will have to show their willingness to invest in ‘working 
together’ on the basis of trust and transparency. Should this fail, regardless of the Rcpc’s 
intentions, a (protracted) transition, within these Member States, to a system of 
administrative law enforcement against collective infringements of consumer law and a 
withdrawal of civil society involvement can be expected.  
 
Enschede October/november 2008 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
121 Ammerlaan and Janssen, De Consumentenautoriteit; een introductie, Tijdschrift voor consumentenrecht en 
handelspraktijken, 2006/5, p. 140-146; Vos and Ammerlaan, supra note 93, p. 82.  
122 If only we consider the many cooperation protocols, recommendations and positions that will be the result of 
working in networks… Overstretch may lead to confusion, hesitance to act, disappointment and decline in trust. 
